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Introduction 
 
Better capitalized financial markets help businesses grow. They decrease the need for 
conglomerates and business groups which can produce and distribute cheap capital 
among members. Or do they? Such a question holds particular relevance for companies 
like the Thai 7-Eleven franchise operator CP ALL. CP ALL – a subsidiary of Thailand’s 
largest private company Charoen Pokphand – has seemingly inserted its 7-Elevens in a 
wider “value web.” Such value webs seemingly allow Charoen Pokphand to combine 
various related economic activities together in a way that Thailand’s open markets can 
not with contracts. Yet, the disparate services providers which make up CP ALL’s value 
chain have bargaining power which may make CP ALL’s success a bigger boon for them 
than for Charoen Pokphand. How to think about the division of spoils between CP ALL 
and those that provide it with the services which contribute to its value chains? Why does 
CP ALL seem to avail itself of far less capital from the Bangkok stock market and banks 
than its foreign peers?  
 
In this paper, we provide a model of the best “location” for firms like CP ALL’s service 
providers along its various value chains.1 We also hypothesize that increases in capital – 
and/or decreases in the cost of capital – may actually decrease CP ALL’s ability to 
expand its economic footprint. Similarly, increases in labour’s productivity (and wages) 
as Thailand develops may put companies like CP ALL in peril – as their value service 
providers sap away their profits. If true, such a model would offer important caveats to 
the emerging consensus among economists that the increasing wages and labour 
productivity concomitant with development leads to business development. The model 
also potentially provides exceptions to the consensus that capital market development 
helps promote business development.  
 
Literature Review 
 
Few economists have attempted to seriously modelled value chains – be they in the retail 
and convenience store segments -- or elsewhere. Until now, most students of economics 
and business have contented themselves with drawing boxes and arrows around various 
parts of a business’ operations (Walters and Rainbird, 2007). Economists have modelled 
value-added processes (Koopman et al., 2008). Yet, a mathematically rigourous model 
which puts the arrows Michael Porter (1985) drew in this book into a framework of 
Greek letters remains sorely lacking.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper provides the more formal model inspiring our INSEAD Emerging Markets Institute blog entry 
about CP ALL. For the lighter analysis, see Bryane Michael, CP All: The Case of the Foreign Licensing 
Agreement Turned Value Web, available online at:  
https://blogs.insead.edu/emi/cp-all-the-case-of-the-foreign-licensing-agreement-turned-value-web/  
Economists seeking models of convenience store strategy and business organisation 
generally must make due with a literature focusing on where convenience stores like 7-
Elevens should locate geographically. Eaton and Tweedle (2012) look at the location 
decision, using a simple Hotelling model. Sato (2009) looks more at the strategic aspects 
such a location decision. Looking specifically at Thailand – a study potentially of great 
relevance for our own analysis of CP ALL – Ngaochay and Walsh (2011) provide a more 
qualitative than modelling-based analysis. To sum up the current state of economic 
modelling of value chains, economists have few models from which to derive inspiration.  
 
Yet, a simple reframing of models from other contexts can provide simple, yet powerful, 
tools for analysing value chains. Models like Eaton and Tweedle – and their brethren – 
look at location in geographical space. Yet, why not reframe “location” not in terms of 
geographical space, but product space? Convenience stores can choose to provide a host 
of services from a range of different possible services. Seim’s (2006) model provides a 
flavour of such an approach – looking at the choice of product-types along a potential 
range or continuum of choices. Yet, rather than extending on Seim-like models, 
academics have opted for the easier – and non-mathematically rigorous – approach by 
describing the value chain construction decision in qualitative terms (Brynjolfsson et al., 
2009).  
 
Location models can help reframe the value-chain decision. Figure 1 shows how to think 
about the “location” of a convenience store in service value attribute space rather than 
geographical space. Marketers have long been familiar with the concept of “value space.” 
Yet, economists have not yet used their tools to formalize companies’ value chain 
construction decision.  
 
Figure 1: Positioning a Convenience Store in Value Space
Binned value category
Level 
The figure shows the location of each retailer in value attribute space. Just like one can talk about the geographical
location of a King Scooper’s store, one can also talk about its “location” in terms of convenience, prices, promotion,
selection and other attributes. Source: graphic taken from Anderson (2013). 
 
Having a model of convenience stores’ value chains’ “location” in product/service space 
(rather than geographical space) allows us to avail ourselves of the range of models 
which explain how investment and interest rates affect these value chains. If we assume 
that the firm is a black-box collection of value chains (and thus abstract away from 
explaining them for the time being), a number of authors would suggest that more and 
cheaper capital leads to business growth (and thus the growth in their value chains). 
Levine and Zervos (1996) and Love (2003) find a positive correlation between stock 
market development and economic growth. Yet, they provide no theoretical model which 
might open up the black box of the firm for potential modellers like us. Alfaro and co-
authors (2006) provide an extensive and rigorous model of the way adding capital to a 
firm can impact on its growth prospects. However, they leave out capital – making their 
supposed model of the link between financial markets and development unusable for our 
purposes. Even the most basic economics primer looks at the way changes in the cost of 
capital affects corporate growth. Yet, surprisingly few models attempt to take the basic 
models from microeconomics and apply them in a business context like CP ALL’s.  
 
Our paper hopes to contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we use one of the 
simplest “location” models – from a seemingly completed unrelated area of economics – 
to show how even using a simple model can provide deep insights about the way 
convenience store operators share profits with those sitting on their value chains; and the 
way changes in investment and returns to investment affect their decisions. Hopefully, we 
will inspire a generation of business scholars to look to the production of economic 
models coming out in places like NBER Working Papers to inspire their own model 
building. Second, we show the counter-intuitive relationship between labour productivity 
(and wages) and value service providers’ ability to extract part of convenience stores’ 
profits. Third, we show that in potentially highly distorted markets like Thailand, optimal 
convenience store sizes would be miniscule relative to their US or EU counterparts, 
partly because such inefficiency allows value service providers to extract some of 
productivity’s benefits. Fourth, we show that as companies like CP ALL’s cost of capital 
decreases, they may not increase investment. Such a result sheds further light on the way 
companies fail to add productive investment even when interest rates fall.  
 
Qualitative Overview of the Model 
 
Our model revolves around two facets of retailing: extending the value chain (a linear model) to 
that of a value net\web (which considers “horizontal” or various dimensions of value) and the 
need for capital to promote productivity. Retailing generally involves transforming inputs into 
merchandize bought from a supplier and sold to a universe of buyers. Management theorists 
usually depict this as a linear process. Value chain profits over time come from retailers’ mark-
ups and the quantity of goods sold with these mark-ups. The “velocity of sales” might refer to the 
rate at which retailers can sell these marked-up goods in each time period. Following the law of 
demand, the higher the mark-up, the lower the quantity demanded.  
 
In a perfectly competitive market, firms will sell goods at the same “velocity” and at the same 
retail price. As all the retailers have equal access to merchandize suppliers, who sell to all 
retailers at the same competitive price, – mark-ups will cover these retailers’ average operating 
and other costs. In other words, all retailers will earn no profits.  
 
In the rarefied world of economic theory, retailers can not escape from an equilibrium level of 
sales which produce no long-term profits. In the real-world, retailers can avail themselves of two 
strategies. First, retailers can increase their sales over time (their velocity of sales) by offering 
lower prices. Retailers can avail themselves of bargaining power to negotiate bulk-rate discounts, 
squeeze economies out of their supply chains, or drive down the cost of their machines and 
workers through production-location decisions and so forth. Cheaper inputs ultimately lead to 
cheaper outputs (and thus higher levels of demand on classically downward sloping demand 
curves)..Retailers who contribute to their profit margins by squeeze out these cost-savings will 
grow their profits with each new sale.   
 
The opposite strategy consists of offering better/different products by pulling together 
different/better inputs and production processes. Customers might buy commoditized bread, guns 
and clothes in theory. Yet, they buy differentiated brands in practice. The shopping experience 
consists of a number of “margins” —like better store locations, more parking space, friendly 
personnel, spacy and tidy shelves, and so forth. Their customers pay a premium to retailers who 
manage to differentiate themselves on the dimensions of experience, quality, location, and others.  
 
Retailers can combine these two approaches. Wal-Mart for example focuses on the customer 
experience while squeezing suppliers. Plotting these two dimensions would result in the retailers 
value space. The value space consists of the range of different activities the retailer and its 
suppliers/partners undertake to increase their profits.  
 
Retailer must make the strategic advantages offered by these approaches sustainable and difficult 
to copy. Creating long-term supplier/partner relationships, purchasing new technologies in 
logistics, merchandising, marketing, as well as designing proprietary business processes and 
developing the relevant skills and competences among the employees represent some ways of 
promoting such sustainability. The retail firm with such sustainable competencies thus positions 
itself in the middle of its value webs. These value webs consist of suppliers who provide goods 
for sale and provide technologies enhancing the quality of those sales. Firms which can create 
these value webs create a source of sustained competitive advantage. Such competitive 
advantages allow them to generate profits in excess of their rivals.  
 
To generate the value which leads to sustained competitive advantage, these firms must invest 
capital and labour. To the extent firms can improve the productivity of such labour and capital, 
they can reduce their costs and increase the value of the value (pardon the pun) offered. As such, 
productivity increases lie at the heart of the value web.  
  
Introduction to the Model 
 
In the original Bai et al. (2013) model, the authors wanted to know to what extent 
producers would move – in geographical space – when confronted with bribery. They set 
up their model adding bribery costs (which we label c) in region i as a drag on profits. 
Equation (1) shows the profits for a firm producing in region i. Figure 2 shows what each 
variable and parameter in the equation means, for readers who did not see this equation 
ad nauseum during their economics education. We also provide variables we will use 
later in the paper in the figure, to provide a single place readers can refer to if they need 
to look up a Greek letter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
rKwLLAKcii −−−= βαπ )1(        (1) 
 
Figure 2: Variables and Parameters at A Glance 
 
Name Symbol Meaning 
“location”-based 
costs of value- 
service providers 
c Originally the bribery rate in a locality, this could represent any 
cost, friction or drag which pulls actual profits away from an 
optimum. We define this as value-service providers’ “cut” of 
convenience stores’ profits.  
technology A Any factor accounting for technological value-added or another 
not attributable to labour and capital (ie total factor productivity). 
capital K A measure of the amount of capital CP ALL or its peers employ. 
capital’s marginal 
product  
α The marginal productivity of capital, measures the impact the size 
of the firms, industry’s or economy’s capital stock on 
output/profits.  
labour L Amount of labour CP ALL or relevant analogue employs.  
labour’s marginal 
product 
β How much final value-added workers produce.  
wage rate w average amount paid to CP ALL’s workers.  
cost of capital r usually the real interest rate, but can also represent the cost of 
raising money on the Bangkok stock market or from Thai banks. 
Variables used later 
μ βαη β +− KA1  Size of the firm (loosely speaking and adjusted for capital 
productivity)  
τ (α+β) multi-factor marginal productivity 
ω αϑw  a wage effect 
λ βαη β +− KrA1  basically a technology-productivity adjusted amount of money 
spent on capital 
 
The simplest extension shows how a seeming model of corruption can become a model of 
value chain construction. Imagine that i represents a place in value space (as we 
described in Figure 1) rather than physical space. Figure 3 shows the hypothetical profits 
for a convenience store operator along 5 various attributes, which we label A-E. These 
attributes can be convenience, friendliness, product quality or any other attribute which 
creates value. The attributes 1-5 represent differing technologies, ownership structures or 
methods of delivering these values. For example, the point B5 may represent 
standardized commodity products delivered by a vertically integrated convenience store 
management company. The point B1 may represent those same standardized commodity 
products delivered by disintegrated, mom-and-pop stores.  
 
Figure 3: Optimal "Path" Through various combinations of 
values chains (the value web)
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The figure shows an example of the “location” of various hypothetical services provided by hypothetical convenience 
store service providers in “product space.” We want to show that convenience stores can “locate” in such a 
product/service space just like they can in geographical space. 
 
We can simply repeat Bai and coauthor’s maths, reinterpreting them to suit our needs. 
Equation (2) shows that the optimal capital-to-labour ratio used by a convenience store 
depends on the cost of labour relative to capital (w/r) and the marginal productivity of 
labour relative to capital (α/β). Equation (3) notes that the optimal amount of capital 
employed depends on its cost r and its productivity β. As convenience stores choose 
worse “locations” in value space, as denoted by a higher ci, the amount of capital they 
must employ rises. The best amount of capital falls as the cost of capital rises (as shown 
by the term with the –β exponent. The optimal amount of capital falls as productivity 
rises (as shown by the exponent with the 1/(α+β-1) term.  
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The authors add “moving costs” in order to derive the best place to move production. 
Equation (4) shows their simple, elegant and powerful model of location costs l. They 
model them basically as a function of a random shock ε. For our purposes, we can think 
of these shocks as changes in technologies. Continuing with our example from Figure 3, 
differences in these costs when moving from 1B to 3D would represent different 
technologies A, differing costs of moving from one type of service offering to the next (θ) 
and the geometric cost of making such changes (η), as scraping a large service offering 
represents a larger cost than simply “moving” a smaller one.    
 
εθ ηAl =          (4) 
 
Following the Bai et al. model intuition, differences in adjustment costs (between 
differing values in what we have called value-space) account for differences in profits. 
Equation (5) shows that the difference in profit from offering one set of value 
propositions to another depends on “moving costs” (which in our reinterpretation consist 
of re-gearing, changing suppliers and so forth).2  As shown in equation (6), the 
technological changes (including changes which affect the cost of vertical, horizontal and 
cross-supply chain integration) would drive differences in convenience stores’ profit 
margins. Whereas 7-Eleven stores may operate independently of a parent corporation in 
the US (for example), organisational costs and benefits driving ε in Thailand may 
encourage integration with a parent like Charoen Pokphand. Nothing about the equations 
we have provided so far differs from Bai et al... except the interpretation.  
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Imagine that – instead of c representation some departure from optimum profits – c 
represents the rents from some technological differentiation which firms can appropriate. 
In the convenience store context, imagine that c represents some gain from the Slurpee 
manufacturers when 7-Elevens use their technology. Suppliers to convenience stores – 
and the stores themselves – want to offer specific services which convenience stores can 
not do without. These “cost” providers – in fact providers of specific technologies which 
allow convenience stores to “locate” on a particular part of the value map in the first 
place – try to maximise c in equation (7). These suppliers want convenience stores to 
profit from their services. If they set c too low, they give money away to the convenience 
stores. If they set c too high, they choke off convenience stores’ profits.  
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The capital convenience stores employ depends on the “costs” the value chain service 
providers charge. In line with the typical intuition behind any kind of optimisation, they 
maximise their own profits when the change in capital (and other factors) no longer 
change in response to these changing “costs.” Equation (8) shows Bai and co-authors’ 
best cost c. Equation (9) shows the way that such costs depend on factors like the 
productivity of capital. We use equation (9) as a point of departure from Bai et al.’s 
model. 
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2 We are relatively relaxed about our mathematical formality at this point (particularly in terms of providing 
subscripts) as we don’t want to stray too far away from Bai et al.’s original conception. Naturally, the 
variables comprising the moving costs we show in equation (5) would consist of matrices whose final 
product would equal the same rank as the “value space” we depict in Figure 2.   
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The Division of Proceeds between Convenience Stores and Service Providers 
 
Basic model intuition 
 
What do we know about the value-service providers maximising their returns? Recall 
from equation (1) that (1-c) of convenience stores’ profits pass on to them. As we 
described in equation (7) value chain service providers seek to maximise c. The core 
insight of the model consists of the tug-of-war between convenience stores which try 
to maximise (1-c) and their value chain providers who want to maximise the value of 
c.  Figure 4 describes how the variables and parameters in equation (9) help determine 
that trade-off between c and (1-c). Just eye-balling the equation, we see that labour 
productivity (α), capital’s productivity (β) and the relative cost of capital (r/w) affect this 
trade off in ways we will describe in this paper.  
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The figure shows the condition whereby service suppliers maximise the amount c they can charge 
convenience stores for their services. Source: Bai et al. (2013).
deterministic part of moving 
costs
Figure 4: Explaining Convenience Store Value Chain Service 
Providers’ Returns 
extent to which firm size
does NOT pass through to 
moving costs
relative cost and productivity
of capital relative to labour
multi-factor
productivity
ratio of what factors contribute to 
productivity vs. what they don’t 
proportion of what suppliers get 
relative to what they don’t 
 
 
What determines the way convenience stores and services providers share profits? 
 
Lemma 1: The cooperative part of value providers and convenience stores equals 
, and the competitive part equals . βαηβββα +−+ KAr 1)( βαϑβα )()1( w−−
 
In order for both value-service providers and convenience stores to benefit, (1-c) must 
rise at the same time that c rises. Equation (9a) reorganises equation (9) to show how (1-c) 
varies with c. Everything that rises in the numerator increases the value of (1-c) – namely 
. Naturally, increasing productivity to labour and capital benefit 
both value providers and convenience store owners by “expanding the economic pie.” 
Increasing scale and scale effects also go to convenience store operators (as value 
providers do not observe all the benefits). Increases in capital deployed also increase 
convenience stores’ share of the gains. Such results do not differ substantially from 
βαηβββα +−+ KAr 1)(
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004), who also note that – in a supply-chain setting – 
various parts of the chain can benefit all together.  
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What about the factors that increases bargaining frictions between convenience stores and 
value service providers? Clearly, any factor productivity not attributable to labour or 
capital (namely 1-α−β) as well as the observable part of convenience store scale (θ) 
would increases these tensions. Convenience store owners can hardly directly claim that 
their results lead to profitability – thus these seeming extra gains represent the first targets 
in any negotiation. Interestingly, labour productivity – and the higher wages such 
productivity attracts – tends to increase value service providers’ share of the economic 
pie. Already, such an observation provides for deep insights when game theoretic and 
other treatments like Yao et al. (2008) do not provide. Such an observation leads us to 
prediction 1. 
 
Prediction 1: Value service providers’ net income will rise relative to convenience 
stores’ net income when wage growth undue to productivity growth outstrips interest rate 
growth.  
 
Equation (9b) can help illustrate this prediction. In that equation, we show the 
proportional returns to convenience stores as a percent of returns to value service 
providers. In theory, rising wages would reflect increasing labour’s marginal productivity 
α relative to capital’s β.  As an a appears in both the numerator and denominator, the 
term (1-α−β)/(α+β) would become smaller. On the other hand, the term, wβ/r would 
become larger.  
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The economic intuition might be that value service providers, seeing labour militating for 
higher “unjustified” returns would do similarly. Such a reaction could only occur when 
convenience stores have some degree of market power driving up profits about the level 
needed to pay factors of production – otherwise no resources would remain to satisfy the 
demands of value added providers. In a more competitive situation, labour and service 
providers would need to split the benefits that higher labour productivity provides.  
 
Equilibrium returns to value service providers 
 
How much money can value service providers earn? Equation (9b) provides the intuition 
for the relative distribution of “spoils” between convenience stores and their value service 
providers. Recall that c in fact can represent a range (vector) of ci of various service 
providers. Thus, knowing the returns these value service providers can earn can help 
“size” the convenience store industry’s related sub-sectors. By implication, their size also 
determines the optimal size of Thailand’s convenience store sector – and thus CP ALL’s. 
 
Lemma 2: Convenience store operators can keep all of their profits (and value service 
providers get nothing) only for special types of production functions, when τ=1 and  
λ
λωτ
6
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)(4
1
22 βα
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−=   
and under the Pyrrhic victory case when r=0, θ=0, w=0, α=0, β=0, and if the 
convenience store size equals zero. 
 
So what is c? In other words, how much should these suppliers charge? Equation (10) 
shows equation (9) which we solved for c. Let  and let lambda represent 
the extent to which returns to capital do not pass through. Let 
βαη βλ +−= KrA1
αϑϖ w= and let omega 
represent a wage effect. Finally, let , where mu equals the effect of capital. 
The basic intuition of the equation shows that the absolute value of these returns   
βαη βμ +−= KA1
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When do value service providers receive none of the economic pie. In that case c=0, and 
equation (11) shows the condition under which that is true. If q= , 
z= , then equation (12) shows the case more clearly. Equation (11) is true 
when the denominator in under the radical equals zero, namely when τ=1. Alternatively, 
when the last term equals zero, namely when 
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One other situation exists where value service providers get nothing. And what about 
when they get nothing (in other words convenience stores get all the benefits)? For 
equation (9b bis) to equal zero, any one of the factors or variables can equal zero. If r=0, 
θ=0, w=0, α=0, β=0, and if the convenience store size equals zero, then convenience 
stores obtain the Pyrrhic victory of getting 100% of $0.  
 
Corollary 1: Value service providers obtain all the benefits of convenience stores’ efforts 
only under the very particular case when convenience store sizes correspond to  
)/)((*)/()1( ββ βαϑβαβα rw+−− , namely when labour “value” (wages and 
productivity) are extremely high.  
 
We prove this by returning to equation (9b). After setting c/(c-1)=1, and some math, 
equation (13) shows that these value service providers obtain all the benefits when the 
scale of convenience stores (A1−η Kα+β) equals just the right proportion of wages (and 
labour productivity) to capital returns and capital productivity. Remember that usually 
α<1 and β<1 and A as well as K must represent large figures (in the millions of dollars). 
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If we set α=.6 and β=.2, just for the sake of a concrete example, then equation (14) shows 
exactly how big that convenience store size should be. Notice that such a relation 
depends on the wage rate relative to the real interest rate (market returns to capital). All 
other things being equal – and assuming that the value of convenience stores comes in at 
a standardized value of 1, equation (15) shows that such wages must equal roughly half 
of such a standardized value (before taking interest rates and θ into account).  
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Thinking through the case of Thailand 
 
How would competition for profits change in a perfectly competitive system? 
 
We saw previously that the division of profits between convenience stores and their 
value-service providers depends on labour and capital productivity. Rattso and Stokke 
(2003) represent one of the many voices provides evidence about the gap between Thai 
productivity levels and those in the US and EU. As such, it makes sense to consider how 
the division of spoils differs when technology size (basically firm size) and productivity 
shocks affect equation (9).  
 
Lemma 3: Differences in productivity translate into lower value service providers’ 
shares of profits if τ>1 or λ/ω<1.    
 
When do convenience stores increase their share of profits relative to value service 
providers? Equation (16) shows the way c/(1-c) changes with a change in technological 
factor A. All the terms in equation (16) are positive. Thus, any decrease in c/(1-c) must 
correspond with either an impossible negative value for (1-η) or increasing returns to 
scale (such that τ>1). When τ>1, (1-τ)>0 and the whole expression becomes negative. 
Similarly for equation (17) and equation (18), c/(1-c) decreases when either λ/ω<1 or 
again when τ>1. In other words, differences in alpha and beta only make a difference 
for very small, wage intensive firms.  
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Prediction 2: Convenience stores exhibiting strongly decreasing returns to scale should 
have a large value webs (large numbers of different value chain service providers) and 
increasing returns to scale should have smaller value webs.   
 
If we can believe anecdotal evidence, the model’s prediction seems well confirmed. 
Local newspapers have already said “bye bye big stores, hello small stores.”3 The model 
also explains why some countries have experienced the “supermarket revolution” – while 
others haven’t (Reardon and Hopkins, 2006).  
 
Does more bank and stock market capital make CP ALL better off? 
 
How does the optimal amount of capital change as service providers’ power strengthens?  
 
How does the optimal amount of capital deployed by convenience stores change in 
response to various factors? Equation (19) shows the extent to which convenience stores 
deploy capital. Their capital allocation decision clearly depends on c, τ (multifactor 
productivity) and ω (a factor encapsulating labour/wage effects). As multi-factor 
productivity rises, so does the optimal amount of capital deployed. As expected, as value 
providers take a larger share of the pie, the optimal level of capital falls.  
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Changes in the cost of capital – whether such capital comes from banks or the stock 
market – determines the amount of capital convenience stores deploy. Equation (20) 
shows how this amount of optimal capital changes as the cost of capital changes. The 
changes match our intuitions. Increases in convenience store sizes (shown by A1−η) also 
tend to reduce capital’s response to a changing cost of capital. Interestingly, the way 
capital changes in response to changes in the cost of capital does not depend on the level 
of the firm’s previous investment (namely its level of capital). As value service providers 
                                                 
3 Pitsinee Jitpleecheep, Bye bye big stores, hello small stores, 2013, available online. 
increase their share of convenience stores’ profits, the sensitivity of capital with respect 
to the cost of capital falls.  
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Prediction 3: To the extent Thailand productivity falls short of productivity in other 
countries, companies like CP ALL’s optimal capitalization remain less sensitive to the 
cost of capital than in other places.   
 
Equation (20) shows the basis for our third prediction. Higher levels of capital and labour 
productivity τ tend to decrease the amount total investment (K) needs to change when the 
cost of capital changes – as τ appears in the radical and in the denominator of the first 
term of equation (20). 
 
Similarly, the way investment levels in convenience stores changes in response to value 
service providers share of their profits behaves relatively similarly. Equation (21) shows 
(unsurprisingly) that as their cut of convenience stores profits rises, the optimal level of 
capital falls. As factor productivity rises, capital needs to change less in response to 
increased demands from these value service providers. As such, improving productivity 
represents an important and useful method of adapting when external factors would 
require convenience stores to change their “location” in their value chains/webs.  
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How would differences in the cost of capital and the amount of money value service 
providers take affect investment in companies like CP ALL? In other words, what forces 
would a convenience store’s investment experience as r and c change – at different levels 
of these variables? Equation (22) shows the way convenience stores’ total investment 
changes for changes in the cost of capital and c. Economists will recognise the equation 
as a gradient. In order to provide intuitions into the behaviour of the gradient, we can 
illustrate with some sample values of several of the variables.  
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Relatively common sense parameterization of our models shows the forces acting on any 
convenience store’s optimal investment stock. If we set constant returns so τ=1, and A^1-
η=1, Figure 5 shows TWO stable paths through the cost of capital and the proportion of 
returns gained by value service providers. If the initial cost of capital is too low, then the 
amount of money demanded by value service providers skyrockets quickly – and the 
whole enterprise collapses on itself. If the cost of cost of capital is high enough, then 
convenience stores  
 
Figure 5: The way that costs of capital and convenience store profits interact 
 
 
The figure shows the vector plot for equation (22) in the paper, under strict assumptions about constant 
returns to scale and a unit value of technology and capital.  
 
Prediction 4: For reasonable parameterizations, the cost of capital for any convenience 
store group like CP ALL must exceed 66% per annum in order to give convenience stores 
enough bargaining power to keep most of their profits. Once solidified in their gains, they 
will have high costs of capital and low levels of sharing with these service providers.  
 
Our prediction comes from eye-balling figure 5. Assuming we have plotted the equation 
correctly, we have tried to draw the two steady-state paths in the figure in black. As 
shown, the proportion of service providers’ returns (c/(1-c)) seems to increase no matter 
which path the convenience store’s investment falls. Yet, that cost of capital can be 
higher or lower. Moreover, at about (c/(1-c))=0.5, dynamic forces seem to act to pull 
back these benefits with attendant higher costs of capital. This suggests that if 
convenience store managers manage to negotiate relatively little profit sharing with 
these value chain “partners” when they first open, they will not need to share in the 
future. Otherwise, convenience stores seem to trade-off payments to capital providers for 
payments to value-chain partners.  
 
Prediction 5: Convenience stores will have no profits after accounting for dissipation in 
the cost of capital and value service providers’ payments.  
 
Firms do not make abnormal profits, otherwise they either get competed away or spend 
on factors of production and inputs. Yet, Equation (1) allows for the possibility of such 
profits. Indeed, CP ALL indeed continues to make profits.4 How much profit (1-c) should 
convenience stores like CP ALL make over time? Let’s assume for the moment that 
profits represent an undetermined function of profits π(K). We will show shortly why we 
leave the functional form general rather than solve one of our previous equations to 
derive the exact relationship. Equation (23) shows then the stock of potential profits for 
various levels of capital as we integrate over various costs of capital and levels of value 
service provider payments (which we normalize between 0 and 1). Trying to solve for 
any value doesn’t matter -- the result always equals zero.  The way capital contributes 
to profits in our model does not really matter. The model, when we put in values in the 
range between 0-1 for r and c comes up zero.   
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The term (1-τ)(1-c) explains the dissipation of these profits. We noted above that – when 
convenience stores deploy their optimal capital – they trade-off payments to financiers 
versus value-chain service providers. No matter how capital finds its way into profits 
(namely the functional form of π(K)), these profits will dissipate over time. The press 
articles on CP ALL we have cited in this paper note the company’s profits. Yet, mention 
always appears about the money the company must spend on expansion – namely on r 
and c.  
 
But what about the behaviour of profits in a small localized area? Maybe the “collapse” 
of equation (23) occurs because we have chosen endpoints corresponding to 0 and 1. 
How does the cost of capital and these value-chain providers’ payments act within this 
boundary? In other words, does r and c diverge from each other in a small localized area 
within 0<c<1 and 0<r<1? Equation (24) provides the answer. To make the maths only 
slightly more tractable, we set 
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4 See Anuchit Nguyen, CP All Plans 10,000 7-Elevens to Sustain Growth: Southeast Asia, Bloomberg, 9 
Aug 2012, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/cp-all-plans-10-000-7-elevens-to-
sustain-growth-southeast-asia.html  
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As before the divergence of r and c from each other collapses to zero. After testing the 
equation for a range of values, all our answers came back undefined. On the one hand, it 
is extremely vexing to build and use a multivariate calculus study, only to find out the 
result equals zero. On the other hand, it is gratifying to hypothesize a well-proven result 
from economics – that firms’ profits dissipate into zero. If CP ALL earns large profits 
now, our model predicts that more of that profit goes to financiers and value-chain 
partners than meets the eye. To determine the real extent to which these parties share in 
CP ALL’s fortunes, we would need to look at its shareholders, bankers and partners who 
share in its current bonanza.  
 
Conclusion 
 
What would a convenience stores “value web” look like in theory? Economics have 
provided few models to inspire business theorists. Business theorists looking for models 
of convenience store operators like the Thai CP ALL have even less to grab on to. In this 
paper, we have taken a simple model from a recent NBER Working Paper series, and 
adapted it as a potential model of convenience store value chains. We find that 
convenience stores may not want to raise capital from Thai banks and the Bangkok stock 
market when labour productivity exceeds capital’s. We also find that inefficiencies 
inherent in Thai markets may significantly reduce the optimal size of a convenience store 
operator like CP ALL. These operators may also (counter-intuitively) need to give up a 
significant share of their profits to “value service providers” when the cost of capital falls.  
 
Our model’s predictions suggest several things about broader received wisdom of 
management and economics. First, even developing countries like Thailand’s capital 
markets may not make their convenience store operators more profitable. They profits 
depend on their value webs/chains – and indeed should come to zero in the longer-term. 
Second, several possible configurations of value chains/webs exist – with their attendant 
division of profits with financiers. Contrary to received wisdom in the business literature, 
no one perfect method may exist (or need to exist) of putting a firm’s value chains 
together.5 Third, labour intensive economies – and economies with low multi-factor 
productivity – may have difficulty developing large, integrated convenience store 
operators. Economists as far back as Heckscher-Ohlin have theorised about the difficulty 
of raising the capital intensivities of companies in countries where labour represents the 
country’s comparative advantage. Such an issue plagues Thailand to this day.  
                                                 
5 See Taylor (2005) for a related discussion in the agro-industry.  
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